Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ / 預金保険機構)

TL;DR

The Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan (DICJ, 預金保険機構) is the statutory deposit-insurance and failure-resolution authority for Japan’s banking system. It is established under the Deposit Insurance Act (預金保険法) as a special juridical person jointly capitalized by the Japanese government, the Bank of Japan, and member financial institutions. Unlike industry bodies such as Zenginkyō or JSDA, DICJ is a statutory authority with binding powers — it insures deposits up to the protected limit, administers failure-resolution of insolvent banks, and operates as the public mutual backstop for the banking system.

Wiki route

This entry sits under financial-regulators INDEX. Read it with the banking industry-body stack — Japanese Bankers Association, Regional Banks Association of Japan, Second Association of Regional Banks, Zenshin-kyō, and Trust Companies Association of Japan — to see the full safety-net layering, and with the insurance-side statutory counterparts Life Insurance Policyholders Protection Corporation of Japan and Non-Life Insurance Policyholders Protection Corporation of Japan. Statutory backdrop sits at INDEX and bank-license-and-baas-boundary; the wider operator universe is in INDEX.

Legal route / statutory position (法令の根拠)

DICJ is established under the Deposit Insurance Act (預金保険法, Act No. 34 of 1971).¹ It is a 認可法人 (authorized juridical person) — not a private association — jointly capitalized by the national government, the Bank of Japan, and member financial institutions, with the FSA as the principal competent supervisory authority and the MOF / BOJ as co-stakeholders for broader financial-system stability.² This positions DICJ structurally between the industry-body layer (JBA etc.) and the regulator layer (FSA) — it is a statutory operator of the deposit-insurance scheme and the financial-system safety net, not a regulator and not an industry association. Membership is mandatory for: city banks, regional banks (first-tier and second-tier), trust banks, shinkin banks, credit cooperatives, labour banks (労働金庫), and other deposit-taking institutions designated under the Act. Notably, Japan Post Bank joined the standard DICJ regime after privatization, while institutions outside the deposit-taking commercial-bank lane (such as agricultural co-operative banking via JA Bank) have separate but analogous safety-net frameworks.

Function / scope

DICJ’s published outline organises its work as:²

1. Deposit insurance — collection of insurance premiums from member institutions, maintenance of the deposit-insurance reserve, and payment of insured deposits when a member institution fails. The standard protected amount is principal of ¥10 million per depositor per institution plus interest, with full protection retained for non-interest-bearing settlement deposits under the permanent settlement-account protection regime.
2. Failure resolution — administration of failed-bank resolution, including financial assistance to acquiring institutions, asset purchase from failed banks, and operation of bridge-bank mechanisms when an immediate buyer is unavailable.
3. Crisis-response measures — administration of Article 102 measures (capital injection, full-deposit protection, special supervision) when designated by the Prime Minister and confirmed by the Financial Crisis Response Council under the Deposit Insurance Act crisis-management provisions.
4. Asset management and recovery — operation of the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC, the asset-recovery subsidiary) for failed-bank loan-portfolio workout, with proceeds returned to the deposit-insurance reserve.
5. Failure-resolution preparedness — coordinated drills with member institutions on data-quality requirements for rapid name-by-name depositor payout (the so-called 名寄せ data quality), recovery and resolution planning (RRP) coordination with FSA and BOJ for systemically important institutions.
6. Industry coordination — operation of the dormant-deposit transfer regime (休眠預金等活用法) by which long-dormant deposits are transferred from member banks to public-interest activities under defined procedures.

DICJ also operates specialty regimes for cooperative financial institutions and for crypto-asset custody under more recent statutory expansions.

Membership / governance

Member institutions are statutorily designated deposit-taking institutions. Examples documented in this vault include — across the banking index — MUFG Bank, SMBC, Aozora Bank, Seven Bank, Sony Bank, Daiwa Next Bank, AEON Bank, Japan Post Bank, plus regional banks and shinkin banks across the system.

Governance is set by the Deposit Insurance Act: a Board appointed with FSA / MOF / BOJ involvement, with the chairman a high-level public-sector appointment, and an Operations Committee for technical decisions. Funding flows from member-institution premium collections plus historically appropriated government / BOJ contributions during crisis periods.

Related industry adjacency

DICJ is the bank-side statutory safety net. The insurance-side analogues are Life Insurance Policyholders Protection Corporation of Japan and Non-Life Insurance Policyholders Protection Corporation of Japan. Investor compensation in the securities lane runs through the Japan Investor Protection Fund (separate from JSDA self-regulation). For the bank industry-body layer see JBA, Regional Banks Association of Japan, Second Association of Regional Banks, Zenshin-kyō, and Trust Companies Association of Japan. For licensing routes that determine membership eligibility see INDEX and bank-license-and-baas-boundary.

Why this page matters

DICJ is referenced implicitly in nearly every bank entry in this vault — “deposit insurance up to ¥10 million”, “failure-resolution backstop”, “dormant-deposit transfer” — but without a dedicated page those references are unanchored. This entry pins:

• The statutory authority distinction: DICJ is a 認可法人 with binding statutory functions, not an industry association — it can administer failure-resolution and operate the RCC, neither of which an industry body could do.
• The premium-funded mutual nature: deposit insurance is funded by member institutions themselves through statutorily required premiums, making it a public-mutual scheme even though the body itself is a statutory authority.
• The crisis-mode trigger: Article 102 measures are exceptional and require formal designation; routine bank failures use the standard insurance and resolution lanes.
• The boundary with industry self-discipline: DICJ does not set conduct rules — that’s the FSA via supervision guideline and the industry-body model rules. DICJ acts after a failure is declared, not as a behaviour-modification body.

Related

• financial-regulators INDEX
• Japanese Bankers Association
• Regional Banks Association of Japan
• Second Association of Regional Banks
• National Association of Shinkin Banks
• Trust Companies Association of Japan
• Life Insurance Policyholders Protection Corporation of Japan
• Non-Life Insurance Policyholders Protection Corporation of Japan
• JSDA
• FSA
• INDEX
• bank-license-and-baas-boundary
• MUFG Bank
• SMBC
• Japan Post Bank
• INDEX

Sources

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[!info] Confidence note confidence: likely. Statutory route via the Deposit Insurance Act, membership scope, function buckets including failure-resolution and Article 102 crisis measures, and RCC subsidiary structure sourced from DICJ’s own overview pages and Deposit Insurance Act text as checked 2026-05-24. Specific reserve / coverage statistics drift over time and should be re-verified from DICJ’s latest annual report before quoting in a quantitative analysis.

Footnotes

1. 預金保険法 (Act No. 34 of 1971), https://laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/346AC0000000034 ↩

2. 預金保険機構「機構概要」, https://www.dic.go.jp/yokinsha/index.html ; DICJ English overview, https://www.dic.go.jp/english/ ↩ ↩²